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ABSTRACT
Under a previous contract with the NASA Langley Research Center
(NASA Contract NAS1-12668 ), Raytheon greatly extended a;ii existing computer
program called CARE (Computer Aided Reliability Evaluation), thereby enabling
it to calculate the reliability of any dual-mode, spare-switching computer
system.
	
results of	 Ithat eCCort are described in "Reliability-Mode _
erivataLion of a Fault-Tolerant, Dual, Spare-Switching, Digital Computer
System, Final. Report", 25 March 1 1974, (Raytheon Report No. ER74-4108)
The emphasis in that report was on the computer program itself; the
mathematical model on which the program was based was briefly outlined but
not described in de ,>ail. This document supplements this earlier report by
providing such a ae,cription, presenting some illustrative examples, and
examinin g; the possi.ility of extending the computer program even further,
to enable it, in pa.,°ocular, to accommodate computer configurations involving
more than t,wo moue.; ;ol' operation.
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i, j,k,A A Non-negative integers - indicies of sum ation.
i',j' jjk' Biased sumrstion indicies; e.g. i' = i + c with c -
a constant.
Integer (subscript) indicating mode of operation.
x Integer (subscript) indicating conTuter stage (e.g.
CPU, I/0'unit,, memory modules etc
Number of identical operational units needed at stage x
x, 2 in mode
r
^.s 1 - Qx 2 - 1 if units that were active i,n mode 1 	 -
bu^ are initially not needed in mode 2 can be treated
as spares; r = 0 otherwise (or if Qx ,2 a Qx,l).
S x The number of spare units initially available to stage x.
Time variables
Time needed to test a spare at stage x during mode Z.
x,R,s y
s
f
Hazard rate for,an active unit at stage x.
'	 P x Hazard rate for a dormant unit at stage x. R
Kx ),x/µx = dormancy factor for stage x.
X i , Rate of occurrence of "category i" failures; i.e. 
failures that prevent the system from operating in
mode -Z for any y, < i, i = 2,3, ..., but do not preclude
operation in any mode l z i
r	 ^ hate of occurrence of Transient failures a^.
a
The probability that exactly i of the Sx spares available
at sta;;e x have been used after t time units of operation
in mode 1.
*The sus	 : ripts`on these symbols are appenue i only wnen it is 'necessary to
cj ex; 1;	 t1- 1,W^ WC44.,	 T he 	 rar	 =--Ae,, _stages etc.	 hius, for
`	 exams le, 't^,e 'y^nY t^l Qjx is frequently represented by simply ;Q with the
sul ,scri• +':i implied.
R(t;) System reliability; i.e. the probability that the
system-is still operating successfully at time t.
R,4 ( t ) Probability that the system is still operating at
time t and that it is operating in mode A.
xh ^R(S
x) t) The probability that stage x has operated successfullyin mode 1 for t time unitsggiven that Sx operational
spares were initially avaii.+sble.
Hx(+) Transition probability density; i.e. probability density
-of'a failure in stage x resulting in a successful degen-
eration to mode 2 due to the lack of any remaining spares.
Sx(tp r) Probability that stage x survives until time r in mode
and from time r to time t in mode 2.
-Td(t) Probability that system successfully enters mode 2 due
to a deficit of spares in some stage and (given no category
three failures) survives in that mode until time t.
T2(t) Probability that system succeEsful.ly enters mode 2
following a category two failure and (given no category
three failures) survives in that mode until time t.
C 
x, 2,i,j,k 'rhe ocmdikj nnal probability that the system can recoverfrom a fault in stage x during mode A, given that the
m
_fault belongs to fault class j,, is detected by detector
i, and that the kth spare for stage x is the first spare
found to be operational.
d Fraction of faults at stage x belonging to class j during
x, k, J mode A . i
Cx
,
k Coverage (i.e. the conditional recovery probability)
for stage x during mode k=given that the kth spare
is the first spare found to be operational;
Cx,^, ; k	 dx,.e,	 Cx,,t^i,jsk
a
i	 .
C., Cx,I,1
b x Cx,1e,1/Cxj t,2
C1 ,1Z,k The superscript C) on these terms indicates transitional
roverai­ .arame ers:	 .e._Cx ^ l,k denotes "he coverage in
stage x during mode x when none of she k-1 remaining, spares
x,i l k are operational and it is hence` necessary to degenerate
to mode k + 1.
fn
t^
•
p
` e4
". .. i
PXsAyip j The probability that a class j fault in stage x during
mode x- would be detected by detector i were it the only
detector operating.
Px,A 1 i r j Px,,t,	 , j(t) Rate at which detector i would detect category j-faultsin stage x 4u ing. mode 1, were it the only detector operating
(f fx	 t	 at A 1)
F(^O	 71fxf (t) dti	 , ^, ^,
0
Px	 gx,	 (t) Rate at which detector i detects category j faultsi	 1I,	 , j^^^	 ^^ in stage x during mode k given that all other relevant
detectors are also in operation.
p tx,'.,i,j Probability that a category j fault in stage x detectedby detector i during mode, is successfully isolated to
the faulty unit.
'	 h	 (t)Px,k, i ,J	 x,,i,j Isolation rate associated with detector i foJ.lowin	 ag
category j fault in stage x;during mode 0
( r	 (t) dt'hx''^^i'j1J
'
Px't Probability that a'spare can be successfully testedin stage x during mode A.
<l
rx,^,^,j	 r , Probability of successful recovery in stage x during
mode A following a class j fault detected by detector
=	 (r)	 r, 	 (r	 r ) i when the detection and isolation rates are randrespectively.
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The reliability model implemented in CARE, II (i.e., the Raytheon
extension to the CARE program) can be described with reference to Figure 1.
i
The computer system being modeled is assumed segregated into n stages
U s n-5 8) with switchable spares separately provided for each stage.
Two modes of operation are possible. In mode 1, Q l identical units must
1
	
	
be functioning at stage i, i = 1,2,..., n , for the system as a whole to be
operational in that mode; in mode 2, Q 21 units are required at stage i.
The system begins operation in mode l (cf. Figure l) and continues
in that mode until a`failure occurs that either forces the system into mode
2 or else causes a system failure. The latter Can be caused by a coverage
failure or by a category three hardware failure. This latter term includes
f
	
	
all those failures that, by themselves, preclude further operation regardless_
of the number of functioning units at any stage. (Category three failures
are frequently referred to as single-point failures.)
Degeneration to mode 2 can be caused either by a category two hardware
failure or by spares exhaustion in any particular stage; i.e. by a failure
in any one of the ('li units needed at stage i alter all o the a, az _La..^a
spares for that stage, have already been used. A category two Failure is
one that prevents further operation in mode 1 even though a sufficient number
of units is_`savailatle,at each stage. (E.g., if mode '1 operation entails
the comparison of the outputs generated by two independent, parallel systems,
a Iail.re_- in the comparator could con.titute a category two failure.`)
Similarly, the system will contii,ue to operate in mode 2 until a coverage
i'ailuru, a category -hree iailral'e, or a failarE iO11Gr: i:,a the 3eyletiol_ c.- all
3
4 ^GP
Q^ 4

,r
+4
 asble - 'for -the Otago in question causes the whole system to
iI
It will be noted from Figure 1 that both permanent and transient
1
n
hardware failures are modeled.	 Since transient failures by definition do
-	 not permanently disable any hardware, there are only two possible outcome
of such a failure: either the system recovers from a transient failure and
successfully resumes the application programs or it does not.	 The latter
f	 case is defined as a system failure.
The fidelity with which this model determines the reliability of an
actual system is highly dependent upon the accuracy with which the various
coverage probabilities indicated in Figured can be determi.ried. 	 That is,
-, v-n'a hardware failure of a particular sort, and the availability of the
necessary spares, what is the conditional probability that computer system
can ac',ually recover and resume its intended function? 	 Because of the
importance of these; parameters, a coverages model was also postulated and
programmed as part of the CARE II package. 	 This model provides a means for
calculating coverage as a ,Function of the type of failure experienced, its
..^ _ < = v:. . ° ,-^-; 	 -'	 l :	 s . , permanent or T ransient), the number of spares
una	 ._ :_	 t	 tes t e 	 tefore an operational one is found, the time dela;-s as-
soda—,r: with the various fault detection and isolation mechanisms, and the
I • oca:	 a successful recover- can ce achieved gl : e,;
failure and	 r-	 seconds needed to isCola-e
-.,
Details of the coverage model implemented in CARE II are presented in
Sec' ion: III•
	
1:1:f!	 !!U	 a	 ti	 t	 T±	 however,	 °i rs ^	 -ies-, rites the CP.RE `II
^:^^	 i.wle coverages and reliabilit,,relia luilitmodel itself.	 Some spP i``i
c, i. ,	 are solved analytically' in Sectio:: IV inn
	 t,) illustrate
i

TT. Reliability Model ry 'vation
J
T^-_ CAM II reliability model is based on the assumption that each
/ corWrwnt comprising the computer system exhibits a constant failure or
nazard rate A . This assumption, which is almost universally made in
deriving computer reliability models, is well supported by experimental
evidence. The two major limitations to its validity are due to the "infant
mortality" phenomenon resulting in a decreasing failure rate for new untested
parts and to wear-out mechanisms (eege tungsten evaporation in a incandescent
light-bulb filament) causing the failure rate to increase with age. Since
i
f
t
the infant mortality phenomenon can be (and., in those cases in which reliability
is of concern, presumably would be) eliminated by appropriate screen-and-burn-
in procedures,and since wear-out mechanisms are virtually nonexistent in solid-
state devices, the constant failure-rate assumption appears to be entirely
adequate for the present purpose.
If P(t) denotes the fraction of elements of a particular class operating
at time t, then -P ' ( t )dt, with P'(t) denoting the time derivative of P(t),
'_r.-'.i^_,atea Lne Fraction of elements failirr,; in the time interval ( t,t+dt).
The failure rate associated with this class of elements is then:
A(t) _ -
	
rJP(t1
	
(1)
(i.e. the fraction c`_' presently operating elements failing per unit time).
If A (t) = A is cu;.: ant, %er: _he solution to	 (s..:	 ..0
iltior: tt.at P(0) = 1) is:
P(t ) __ e- At
Further, if an irredundant computer n_ •	 comr-,csec	 elements '..a,:,ing
;'ail ,
	
rtt - A1,_,	 ,T:, ,her.	 -rA* tnat wait is still
operatir. t , a* * .' me t, giver, - na-, 	 was oierating at *: ae zero, is the probatAlity
a^
that all of its component parts are operating st time t; i.e.
N
NP(t) =
	
(e -kit)ni = e 
i^ 
1 nili)t = e-At	
(2)
i = 1
N
with A
	
	
niki simply the sum of the failure rates of the unit's
i=1
component parts.
Now, if Q of these units are needed for a given computer configuration to
function properly and if i standby spares are provided which can be switched
in to replace any defective unite, the probability that exactly i such spares
have been required by time t is simply the probability that exactly i unite out of
a total of Q + i-1 units in the configuration have failed and that the (Q + i) th
unit is still functioning. To see this, assign the units used up to time t
consecutive numbers from 1 to Q + i, with units 1 through Q representing the
original Q operating units, unit Q + 1 the first spare switched in to replace
a defective anit, unit Q 4 2 the second spare switched in, etc. Exactly
i spare units will have been used by time t if and only if exactly i cf the
units bearing the numbers 1,2,3,.--, Q +1 -1 have failed. Note that the
^.	
nth _,_ . ;--- s+,il.L re operational since, were it not, a- leas- i + 1
spares would have been required. But the probability P(i,n) of exactly i failures
in n chances, when the probability of an individual failure is ci = 1 - p is given
by the well-known binorrd nal distribution:
p(i,n)=/1\gipn-i
-b -
" ?-0 .... _....^•• y, I:."ri :rang .
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consequently, the probability G(i,t) that 1 of Q + 1-1 units
have failed by time t and that the (Q + 1)th unit is still functioning
is p(i ) Q + 1 -1) with a -Xtthe probability that any one of them
has survived until time t; i.e.:
G(1 o t) - Q+i-1 \1 _ e -Atli (e -It1Q	 (3)^ 1 J `	 // \\	 l/
Note that this last conclusion implicitly assumes equal failure rates
for all Q + i units. If, however, the units that are operational but are
not currently being iced are placed in a dormant mode until they are needed
(e.g. the units are not powered until they are actually needed), this assumption
of identical failure rates may not be valid; the dormant units may well fail
at a rate p significs,ntly less than the active unit failure rate A . This
added degree of freedom potentially complicates the expression for the prob-
ability that exactly i units are required since the probability that a part-
icular unit is still operational is now a function of when it was placed in
the active m de which in turn, is determined by the number of prier fai_.:res.
It can be shown-, however, that the probability of using exact Iv i spares
when Q active units +Lre needed and the active and standby uni_ _'ail-are -rates are
,\and µ respectively, is ec,ual to the urobacility of using exa _-. ;. spares w:.Z-::
XQ/v active units ar- needed for successful operation and the failure rate is
,.	 a.,j 6 ^,andLy snits.
1.i
M
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That is, from equation (3),
G(i't ) 
= ( Kr., + 1 -1) (1 - e "µt 11 (e - µt)	 (4)
with K = AIA. This observation considerably simplifies the subsequent deriva-
tions.
Note that Kq + 1-1 need not be an integer here. The binomial coeffi-
cient:
	
C
K^ +1 -11=	 K + 1-1) (Kq+1-2) ... (IT%
1	 1l	 is
is still de°ined for noninteger values of KQ + i-1 and equation (4) still
holds.
An additional complication results when the possibility of a coverage
failure is acknowled,;ed since the possibility then exists that the system+ was
unat,le to recover ev..n though a spare was available. Moreover, the probability
of s^:-cessf^al recovery may well be further diminished wnen one or more :f
spares has already failed by the time it is needed since this presumably increases
the total time needed to recover. In the CART II reliability model, the coverage
prcta'Lili*.y (determined using the coverage equation: cf., Section III) is
expres--e^ it. --.e form C8 (k - 1) , with k the number of spares that mus' ce
Le.s'.u.i <<.:'ore an ope.-ational one is found. That is, if *..e firs- spare -,es-ed
is	 inns!.	 P	 of recovery is C; if the first spare has failed
but ':e second is functioning, the recovery probability is diminished by the
-8-
factor 6; if two failea spares are encountered the recovery probability
Is decreased by the factor 6 2 ; etc.
Fortunately, the effect of imperfect coverage can be included in equation
(4) simply by replacing the product Kr* by the parameter M = KC6 -1 Q and by
multiplying the result by 6 1 . The resulting probability thus becomes
G (i , t) = (* i -1) 8' (1-e -µt ) i e -KQ'at	 (5)
A proof of the : ,aliaity of t:.is res 1*_ is , resented in the appeniix to
this report.
Equation (5) represents the probability that the Q-unit ensemble
in question survives until time t given exactly i hard (permanent) failures.
The COE II :model also includes the possibility of transient _°a'_'_..res. The
coverage model (cf. Section III) provides a means of determining the prob-
ability Pr of recovering from a transient as well as from a permanent failure.
If transient failures occur at the rate Y' failures per unit time, nonrecoveracle
fail^.^re- `her. occur a`_ the rate Y= (1-P r ))" .	 he probability ;(i,t) ir.
eq.iation (5) must, therefore, be multiplied by the probability a -Y ` that no
nonrecoverable transients occur by time t in order to ottain the probability
, .hat the Q-unit ensemble survivesuntil time t using i spares when bo'. hard
and ^ransien' .`'ailires are taken in'o a-e—unt. The resulting exrress'
becomes:
- Yt rM' i - 11 a i (1
-e -µt ) 1 E - K^ Jut	 ( )
` i l
With these preliminaries, we can now determine the relia:ility R(L)
of the dual-mode computer system. First, let:
r (t) - Rl	 R^ (tl
-9-iiii
R 1
 (t) denoting the probability that ttts system survives until timt t
in made 1 and R2
 (t) the probability that it survives in mode 2. (That
Is, R_ (t) is the probability that tae system is still operating at time t
but* that it had tr, switch to mode 2 sometime prior to time t.)
Let Rx"t (Sx, t) be defined by the expression:
FK P^ juk ' PI GP
S	
ly^u^
x
Rx"L (Sx, t) =E
	
Gx'j (i,t)
i = 0
With Gx'j (i,t) as defined in equation (6). (The subscripts I and x here denote,
respectively, mode l and stage x, and S x indicates the number of spares avail-
able a t stage x.) Thus, Rx,.t(Sx,t) is the probability that stage x is able
to survive 1:. mole i until tizw- t using no more than the Sx spares provided
for it. The expression for Rl(t) is then:
R l(t) = .1 Rx ' l (Sx , t) . e -h2t e ' X?
x
	 (8)
The rroduct over x in equation (8) thus represents the probability that
all	 have survived in mode 1 with none requiring more than its
allo t tu I ::umber of spares. The two exponentials in equa^ion (8) are
simlly _he probabilities of no category two and no category theee fail.:res,
respe ivel;,'-
1:. orler '.o ae t,ermine R,(t) it is convenient to define some eaa^' ^^::al
First, rote that:
" ( - I t he rrnfat`ility that the compu'er system successfully er;^er • s mode 2
:clit-win_ a ca.egor,. 2 failure aria _-;.::- v ; .,^s in mode _- _n-i1 :ime - .	 ) the
Fr.^reril:'_ '.r.at it successfully enters moue 2 due -c a spares de:': 	 in some
(- 4 -g le 	 -4 ' .) 41 041. 11.ec	 -10-
f ^.1
l	 -
r
r
Now let lix ( r ) be the t:-anaition probability density for stage x; i.e. 	 «
the probability density of a failure in stage x resulting in a successful
degeneration to mode 2 due to the absence oi' an, remaining operational spares.
It follows 'hat:
Sx
H x ( r ) -
 Qxl A X
]	
[Gxl ( Sx - i, T ) (1 - e -PAX	 CX ( a x) i 	(10)
i = 0
The first bracketed factor is simply the rate at which failures afflict the
Qxl"unit ensemble defining stage x in mode 1. The second factor represents
the probability that all but i of the Sx
 spares for stage x have been used
by time * and that stage x is still operational at that time. The third
factor is the probability that the i remaining spares have all failed by time
T. The last term is the recovery probability given that i spares must be
t.ent:ed and that degerterat,ion to mode 2 is necessary. (The "primes" on the C
d terms indicate that the transitional coverage may be different than the
coverage when no change is needed even though the same number of spares must
be tested in both cases. The coverage model described in Section III provides
a means for determining this difference by allowing user to specify transitional
paramr • !r.) The prciuct of these terms, summes over all i (i = 0 3 1, ...,	 )
is the ,.,esired probability density.
Further, let S.(t, T ) be *,he probability that stare x survives until time
in rr;jde 1 and from time r to time t in mode 2. This probability can be
expressed ini the Form
^X
	
Ox-L
S (L,*) -
	
[GX,(Z.*) '` 3x1 A)	 - e -µx') 
'x -1.	 a	
µx' a x
^c(,i, t - r) (11)
X
I	 J=r
Th- vracketed u: __^:'s denote, rf°spe_,ively, the ; ,robability that stage x
survives until time r in mode 1 usir,:; exactly I spares, the probal:ilit% that
ML
exactly j of the remaining S x-t spares are still operational at time r , and
the probability that stage x survives for the remaining t - r in mode 2 given
that j spares were operational at time r (cf. equation 8). The definition
of th parameter j' depends upon whether or not the Qx1-Qx2 active units that
were needed in mode 1 but are not required in mode 2 are reassigned to the
,spares; pool. If they are, j' = j + Qxl - Qx2; if they are not j' = J. The
product of these term summed over all combinations of unused and functioning
spares yields the desired probability.*
*This expression for Sx(t, r ) assumes that all remaining spares are tested
immediately following degeneration to mode 2. This allows any defective spares
to be discarded at tha% time and hence, if 8 x2 < 1, decreases the probability
ol'tA coverage iailure in muse r.. 11' tnls is noL done Sx(t, T ) becomes:
Sx	 Sx' - Sx
Sx (t^7	 Gx^2(1, t -*) Gx, l(^, r)
.8 =01=0
Sx
	
>x'
Gx 1(l, ) (i -Q- 1)8 -i (1-e -µxr ) j - i e -(i-Q)µxrGx'2(i,t-*)r,
- 0	 =Q*1 1	 r l
with
0	 Excess acti%-e units
	
.. e . in :-lode .
Q	 ^x^ - Sx	
`-^xl - Qx2	 Excess active units used as spares.
This expreasi.on assume:, that the reassigned active -L:nits are the first to to
used 11,	 C7,	 ....—. 11 ._..	 _.._
r
Y
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tWe can now expret3s T2(t) and Td (t) in terms of previously aefiaee
quantities:
t	
ilffTd( t ) =^ f II	 sy ( t , r )	 F^(,)lr R x ^ 2
 (r,t r)JLe 
-A^T	 d,	 (12)
[.	 1L	 JLx 0	
-3 #x
t
T2(t)
	 f[ 	
Sv(t, -r	 ^, P C2 e -'►2'^ dr
	
l	 J^
Y
Tl.e first bracketed factor in the expression for Td (t) is the probability that
each of the stages comprising the computer system except stage x survives in
mode 1 until time r and in mode 2 from time r to time t (cf. equation (11)).
The second factor is the probability density of a degeneration from mode 1 to
mode 2 at time T caused by a spares deficit in stage x (see equation 10).
The third factor is the probability that stage x then survives in mode 2 from
time T to time t given a total of r functioning spares at time r. The
definition of the parameter r, like that of parameter J' in equation 11,
depends or, whether the Qxl - '-x2-1 former active and still operational units not needed
in mode 2 are reassigned as spares. If they are r = Qxl - Q,x2
-1; if the •
 are not, r = 0.
The last , 'a,Lor in tht expression for idkL1 -10 „-.st the prorpr'l:t,
e:,,or.j two failures occur bel'cre the xegenera`_on to mode 2; after that -f:%e,
of course, category two failures are irrelevant. The product of these factors then
	
is the probability	 Ayr a= e whole c • ;»• ' •nc +n - i me :' ^01P
1 ar.d L,u.. „cntir.u^^ ^,.zcessfully in mole c until time L. Since the degeneration
can occur at any time * in the range (O,t), this product, integrated ever this
entire interval, provides the desired probability Td(t).
o^^c^
1The expression for T2(t) differs from that for Td( t ) in that the
cause of the degeneration is now a -ategory two failure; consequently the
product HX ( r ) RX,2 (r,t - r), representing the probability density of a
degenerative failure at stage x at time rfollowed by its successful operation
in mode 2 until time t, is replaced by A 2C2 e 2 r , the probability density of a
recoverable category two failure at time r. The product in the expression
for T2 (t) is now over all stages, since in this case, none of them is the
cause of the degeneration. That is, for successful operation through a
category two failure, all stages must operate successfully in mode 1 prior
to, and in mode 2 following, this event.
The reliability model implemented in CARE II thus determines the
reliability R(t) defined in equation 7 using the intermediate quantities
defined in equations 8 and 9 through 12. As can be seen, it is a highly
versatile model, allowing arbitrary active and dormant failure rates to be
specified for each of up to eight stages with arbitrary number-s of spares
assigned to each stage. Furthermore, the concept of coverage is fully
integrated into the model with provision for specifying recovery probability
as a function of the stage in question, the number of spares that have to
be tested and the mode of operation (mode 1, mode 2, or transitional). Un-
fortunately the CARE II user can rarely, if ever, be expected to be able
Lo asair;tr these coverage terms with any degree of confidence. For this reason,
a coverage model was also defined ana implemented as part of CARF 77
morel, lescribed in the next section, provides a means of determdninr ~nPsP
covers.ge parameters in terms of more basic parameters which are presumably
7nore rea.?i d'. s, - I -* -d,
	 P` 1, a.
user.
-I--
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I11. Coverage Model Derivation
The purpuse of tine coveragC u,cxitl to to determine UIL CUV'Lra,;e
coefficients aBsociated with the computer system ag a function of
the stage afflicted by the failure, the opera l.ing mode (mode 1, mode 2,
or transitional), the type of fault (perma:ient or transient), and the
numuer of failed spares encountered in the search for a functioning
or.	 Although the coverage model i,uplemented in CARE II can be ased to
evaluate the coefficient C k , (the coverage given k - 1 failed spares) for any
A, the use of such ini •ormatlon would result in a somewhat more complicatea
reliability model than that described in the previous section. There
it was assumed that Ck was of Vie form Ck = C8 (k	 1) for all i = 1,2,....
The coverage model is therefore used to determine C 1 and C2
 only, with
8 defined as the ratio C 2/C l . Since C8 (k	 1) is presumably a reasonably
good approximation to Ck for small k (and is exact for k = 1 and 2 when
8 = C21C1) and since the likelihood of several consecutive failed spares
is generally small in any event, the increased computational time that
would be needed to use the more general coverage coefficients Ck was not
felt to be ,justified.
Conceptually, coverage can be broken down into three basic components:
fault detection, fault isolatio.-i, and applications program recovery. Any
ono: of the following eVchLb .,vI,oI.,Lutes a coverage :ail._ 
to detect the fault, the failure to isolate it to the affected unit and
to replace that unit with a functioning spare, or the inability to effect
a timely recovery of the applications program. The mechanism by which
the failure is detected presurr,.zt_ 	 •_rmines the isolation and recovery
procedures; i.e., there is direct linkage, called a LIE mechanism, from a
1p• {	 recovery rrere'
between a particular fault and a particular detector, however, may be more
complex. Frequently, several aifferent det,ecturs may be capaule of detecting
a certain fault. Which detector actually s , tccePds is a funr-"+-- of the
computer operation being carried out when the fault becomes manifest. The
CARE II coverage model provides a means of determining the probability that
a fault in any specific class or subclass* is eventually detected by a given
detector in competition with other detectors as well as the distribution of
the time delay before this detection taxes place. This information, is suer ►
used in combination with user-provided statistics concerning the isolation
and recovery n°chanisms associated with that detector to determine a coverage
coefficient for that detector. The summation of the probabilities of these
mutually exclusive coverage events then establishes the coverage for the fault
class in question.
The concept of a fault class is basic to the CARE II coverage model.
It cannot be assumed, for example, that if detector A detects 9C4 of all
faults in a ,liven computer stage and detector P also defects 90% of these
faults, that together they detect 1-(1-0.9) 2 = 99% of all faults. It may
well be that they both fail to detect the same 10% of the possible faults
and hence that together they are no more effective than either is alone. 114
the CARE II coverage model, this difficulty was circumvented by requiring
the user to categorize the possible faults afflicting any computer stage.
A fault ,lass is defined as a group of faults whose possible detection
by any specific detector is statistically independent of its possible detection
*The term fault class is used to denote a category of faults afflicting
e stage; a fault subclass refers to a category of faults pertaining to
-or r.:rroses cf this discussion this -is`.inction is not
iLuportant .
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tectors compete against each other across +ault cltasees; hey compete static-
_	
tiaally indepensently, however, within any specif' -las4. In the previous
example, the totality of possible faults at the stage in gwoetion, for ins-
Lance, might be divided into four disjoint classes eacn representing 25`^
of the total. If detector A were then capable of detecting 100% of the
faults in the first two classes and 80% of the faults in the third and
fourth classes, and detector P capabl- 	 detecting 1 nrA of the faults -
classes 1, 2 and 3 and 606 of the class 4 faults, they both would be able
individually to detect 90% of the faults as before. Together, however, the,,
would detect:
3/4-- 1/4(1-( 1- 0.8)(1-0.6))=989
of ttcn faults. If in contrast, both detectors were 100% effective in the
+	 first three classes and 60% effective in the fourth, so that again both
are " Effective overall, their combined effectiveness would be:
	
3/4 * 1/4 (1 - (1 - o.6 )2) 	 r)(4
The task of sef , rewating faults intc classes requires careful analysis
of the Iossible faults that can occur and of the characteristics of the
:::,ai lat l- detectors. ?'t-!e success with which this categorization has been
ac-r- 
-rljshed can be tested by determining for each fault within a given
class, i`s probabili*y of detection 1 . each of `he available detectors.
AL Y AGE L^
OR1G Wig' Qu^
DF Y
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If this se q. of datectior. probabiliti" is identical for all faults in
arU class, a sufficient number of cl.arAses teas been defined; otherwise,
further subdivision or reclessifica" on is needed. Although fault clas-
sification does require detailed kn-ywledge of the types of faults that
can occur, no coverage model can provide a meaningful measure of coverage,
unless this Information or its equivalent le determined.
Once the faults relevant to each computer stage are categorized, the
user must then characterize each detector 1 for each fault class J in each
stage by a detection probability, a detection rate f(t) = fij (t) (as usual, subscripts
will be omitted in the following discussion unless they are needed for purposes
n4P - I Q ^„; t ' . ^'	 P.nA o .4^4- n.4- 	
.
a,. PY. /o- - ..
	
s rh	 { b
rule (for software diagnostics). He must in addition associate with each
leteetor an isolation procedure (characterized by an isolation probability
and an isolation rate h(t), and a recovery procedure (characterized by the
probat ility r (* ) " ) = r'( *) r' ' (* - *' ) with * and r' the times needed
for detection and isolation, respectively. (This form for r ( r ) r'), although
somewc,at restrictive, is felt to be sufficiently , general to encompass the
vast. majority of recovery mechanisms. Factoring r( r , T') in this way implies
that the recovery probability is the product of two terms: (1) an error-
propar^atlon recovexi probability whicn is a function only of the time T
during which the fault condition existed but was undetected; and (2) a
tiny --lost recovery probability which is a (unction of the total *iro ++ T'
elapsed between the occurrence of the error and its isolation. The reason
loo 7:	 :,,t., .1 7,hi!. • retwee n ' hese	 _ ons is that auri:.:
propagation period, the effect of the still undetected error could propagate
_^A_
A
r	 ^
e
to other computer elements, thereby complicating recovery and reducing
the pro:-)ability below that resulting from consideration of the total
"down-time" r + r' alone.
On the baHls of this user-supplied information, the coverage model
determines the resulting coverage C ijk , (when k spares have to be tested)
for each fault class j, and detector i, and, for each stage, calculates
the coverage:
C k _.	 d  L.. C ijk	 (13)
i
with di the fraction of total faults belonging to class J. That is, Cijk
represents the fault class j coverage associated with the DIE mechanism i.
Since detection by detector i precludes detection by any other detector,
the summation over i of these terms represents the total coverage for fault
class j and the we13hted sun over all fault classes thus determines the
overall coverage for the stage in question.
IA-t Pij and P' ij be, respectively, the detection anu isolaLioi, proca-
bilities associated with detector i operating alone in the presence of a
class j fault. Let P'' j be the probability of successfully testing a
spare required as a result of a class j fault and let T s represent the
me needed to complete this test. Finally, let P ij dj j (t) be the prob-
a1 • ility density of the detection of a fault in class j by detector i when
the total fault detector environment is taken into account. (Thus, fij(t)
:s ti ^ ,detection rate or the detector i when no compe`{ng de-, . 	 :'S ar=
present,; gij (t) the analogous function when these competing detectors are
-19-	 ^^^pAg' Q^^
considered.) It will he shown presently that g ij (t) can be expressed
In terms of the set of density functions:
	
PI.j ftj (t),	 = 1, 2s ..., ip ...
The coverage term Cijk can be expressed in terms of the functions and parameters
defined in the preceding paragraphs in the form:
co
Cijk = Pij pij (p".1)jFg ij (r)  r' ij ( T ) fhij ( r - krs ) r' 'i^(r +r') dr'dr	 (14)
	
0	 0
The detection probability density function for the 1th detector is
pijgij ( r ) and the a:;sociated isolation density function is, by definition,
P' ij t ►ij (" ). If k spares must be checked in order to re^over successfully
from a fault, the overall recovery probability is decreased by the factor
(P ., ) k , with P'' the provability of successfully checking out a spare, and
the isolation delay is effectively increased by the factor krs. The term
C• k 
is thus Equal uo the conditional probability that the system can still
recovuv ,, i rrr, a r-secon(i detection delay times the detection probability
density function, multiplied by the conditional probability that the system
can rccuver given that it has survived a r-second detection delay and must
in a(Mi tion undergo a total of r + r ' seconds down-time, times the correspondir;g
isolation density function, the whole thing integrated over all r and *" ,
and mult.iplied by (P" )k.
The only term in equation (14) not i.mediately attainable from the
t'^ -rniti'.i ur, provi if-d by the user IS the cGndl" renal density fun^ti on a • •W.
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fear * 1,11P +e"M is a furttion, not just of the detector 1, but of the entire
enetmblae of dattdftWs and their interrelationships. (Note that the same
compe*?tiv e -elation does not exist betty, 'n isolation and recovery procedures
since these procedures are uniquely deter nin ,.d by the outcome of the competition
among the detectors.) In order to define gij (*), it will be useful to intro,
duce some new terminology. (For notational convenience, the subscript ,j denoting
the fault class in question will be dropped in the ensuing discussion.) Let
Ti = ni T be the periodicity with which software diagnostic program i is scheduled,
let nc be the least common multiple of the ni, and let nc T be defined as the
major cycle. Let t i , t1 + At i b the start ana finish times for detector or
diagnostic program i measured with respect z o the occurrence of a fault for
hardware detectors, and relative to the start of a major cycle for software
diagnostics.
Let t j I = t i I (i) be the maximum value (with respect to v) not exceeding
ti + Ti of the expression (tj + vTj - (k -1)Ti); that is, let t j i + (1- 1) Ti be
the time of the last occurrence of diagnostic proa;ram ,j in the interval separating
the (R - 1) 8t and the Z th occurrence of diagnostic program i. Finally let:
0	 ,q<0
ORIG	^
va, p 	 Fi(7) _	 ii(h) do	 0<'?	 ti
 
f
"`4	 1	 ?! > Ot i
and let Fi ( 7 ) = 1 - Fi ('1 ). (Note that f i (t) is a normalized detection
probability density; its integral over the Ot i - second detection interval
is uni'_.y. Note, too, that the detection delay t i
 is treated here as an explicit
parameter. Thus the detection probability density associated with the i th de-
Lector is of the form Y i f(t - t i ) with f(t) nonzero only over the interval.
Outs sti.)
t
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Test begins at t•:, tire	 Time c` =e :1	 _Test begins t i time units into
units into the v,,," ^h ndnor cycle	 occurrence	 the minor cycle beginning at tine
Z Ti
O vJz	 i
I
tJ 2 + v2 TJ2	
J^+ v2 TJ2 +-' tj2	 til + v  Tit
_ _	 t
Oti
. , 1 - v l TJ1 +,tJl
	
ti + x Ti	 ti T `i T °Ii V ---V
+ ti +ITi
FISURE 2
JOFNARE DIAMSTIC SCHEDULING
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We next observe that the .detection rate of the ith software diagnosLic
program when courting only with the other diagnostic programs Is for,
U t; '► uiT,
nr./ni	 Oti
r(t) ^
	 1	 n	 1 - Pj FJ ('1- *+ niT ; ti - tji)] f' 1 ( ^ ) d,7(15)lC f0	 1 0 J1 i
and i.s identically zero elsewhere. The product here is taken over all j
representing other software diagnostic programs. This expression is most
easily explained wit ►i reference to Figure 2. The crossed-hatched rectangle
there indicates the ime interval during which the ith diagnostic routine is
run for the(t 4 1)st time during a mjor cycle. If this routine
a fault which occurred exactly r seconds earlier, all other diagnostic
pru;!rnmS which were run between these two instances of time (shown as
(luc;hcd lineL in Figure ") must have failed to detect the fault. The prob.-
abl.lih.y of this; event is r%iven by the product over j in equation (15). (It
io as:umcd here: that if a i'ault occurs while the j th routine is being run,
pjut auility LnaL thaL !aulL is detected before the routine is concluded
is
 F1Jtj
fj (r) dr = PjF(t), with t the time the fault occurred relative to
^.rne tvi7ir.ning of the routine in question.) This product multiplied by the
(Ie',ecf.ion rate f' i (n) of the ith diagnostic routine and integrated over all n
iel i^ 1;n( • conditional detection rate of the i tf software diagnostic test during
itc.(A + 1)st execution in a major cycle. It re;nains only to sun this
	 ^^^^'^~
o..r nL runs in each major cycle to obtain the desired detection rate.
bRIGINAL' PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALn y
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The condition detection rates for software detectors when competing with
both hardware and other software detectors can then be expressed in the form:
03i j (*)	 RI 1 - FkFk( T - tk)JE,ij (T)	 (16)
k L
with the product taken over all k corresponding to competing hardware detectors.
That i:,,:;i j (T) is simply equal to g' i j (T) times the probability that none of the
r-omix-t;ing hardware detectors has detected the fault first.
similarly, the conditional detection rate of the i th hardware detector in
the presence of its competitive hardware and software detectors is:
f i r.	
T
^ij( T ) =k 
# 
1 I i - PkFk(* - tk)I^ 1 '-2] Pj ^ g('1) dnlf i (T- t i )	 (17)J	 f	 Jit
	 0
Tta(: product here, taken over all k representing competitive hardware
defectors, is again the probability that none of these detectors has
already succeeded in detecting the fault. The second bracketea term
multiplies this probability by the probability that none of the software
detectors has been successful. either. (The summation is over all it
compe'. in:; software detectors. Note that the g' i j ( q ) functions represent
Exclusive e •ients; hence their weighted sure is indeed the probability
dericity function of interest.)
Ti.ese expressions for B ii (r) equations to and 17) are used in equation
(1-+) to determine the coverage terms Ciik for all 1, ,j, and k. These terms
are uses in equation (13) to calculate a coverage probability, for each stage
and fault type, as a function of the
	 ^P srares that have to
	
'eated.
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The resulting coverage probabilities are then used in the reliability calculations
described in Section II. The examples presented in the following section are
intended Lo illustrate this procedure more fully.
IV. .^-.ome examples
We l'irst consider two examples involving the reliability model presented
ir,	 TT. Both examples are sufficiently simple that they can he solved
analyLically; r_aeh is intended to illustrate the significance of a subset of
' 1, v various parameLers defir.irg -c ruodel.
In the first example we postula,.e a computer system consisting of only ore stage
wi l.ti s spares. Also, in order to concentrate on the parameters of greatest interest,
wf: a;;avan. Ust. the category two and category three failure rates, A2 and A3, and
tr( ra+.e of occurrence Y of nonrecoveracle transient failures are all negligible.
We then nave, from equation j,
(M + i - 1^ ^ i _ E. -µt)1 a 1 e -K(µt
M	 KCB-l.
!,encralld 1,old at least approxima t ely, we :have, from equation 10,
C^"1+S - i -11 (i - e "µ')sa^e - K,^10Ar11(+)
	
^ l A ',	 JS - i
/^G
^t l A^: (r^l	 )^ 	 -µr ) J a o e -- l 	 ^F ^OR PAQ,, 'rS+
-25-
fand from equation 8,
S	 +	 µt i i ^lµt
	
R (t) ^ t Ml i - 1	 ^ (1 - e	 ) a e"1
1=u
and,
µ (t
	
Tr	 M2+
	
- 11 
	
-µ(t 
- T))l a i e -KQ, 2	 - i
R X ^ 2 (r,t T ) -^ (	 i i 	 I
i=0
On substituting the expression for RX,2(r,t - 7) into equation 12, we
obtain:
r
	
U	 fo
/ Ml +	 r	 S+i M2 + i - 1	 t(1 - e -µ, S (1 - e -µ(t -r))i e -K(Ql - c^2)LTr e- 2µt
- Ella C 1	 ) ^ a (	 i	 /i=0	 0
	
Usi ni l, — t2 rorr.ial e:rnans i or. for (i - e 	 ) and
can eab:l; carry ou: '.he integration over T, nctaining:
	
Ml + S	 Sr it a
S + i i--
	
- 1 ^ 1 
^ ( -1
)
KC
 rt_-0 0-0
(a - Q	 1	 L )
-26-
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•Since we will be interested in the limiting case in Which the dorinarncy
facLor K - afr -+ m (i.e. in which µ-+0), we observe that G(i,t)
becomes, under these conditions,
lim	 G(i,L) =	 CA t i	 e -Qkt
K -► cc	 i
Kµ A
(Nul.0 Lhul, in Lhis event G(i,t) is independent of b - This is due to the fact
that wiLhµ= 0 the first tested spare is guaranteed to be functioning.)
When K--*-, µ --P. 0 (with Ku = A ) the above expressions thus become:
S
	IWO Q1AC (CQ 1 A*) 	 a -QIAT
J:
it	 (r ^• — T I	 Q2C k ( t — T))	 e —Q2A ( t — T)l,r
is
i=0
	
!t (t) =r (cc1CAt)	 e _Q1At
i=0
R^ (r,) ._ ^C^,^l ^ F 1	 (^. CJ1 )^	 t S	 i e
	 r' -	 --`;• d T e
a nd
rThe integral in this last expression can be evaluated by again using the
binomial expansion with the result that:
R2(t) - r2(t)
i=0
ri
a=0
S+i+l @1S+1 ^^i S+° (^t^(
	 )^
(7a).
1-e^(@1-@2)J1t SrQ
=0
(@1 -Q2)at
	 e-
1
In Tither of these cases, of course, the total reliability is gust
Rl( t ) + R;,(t)•
In order to reduce these results to a more tractable form, consider the
special case in which Q l = 3, Q2 = 1 1 S = 2. This corresponds to the al6 uk i..•,
in which ;tie system !)cr yins operating in mode 1 with three active units and two
:apare s. It switches to mode 2 after the third failure and operates using only
one active unit. The remaining active unit that was still functioning in mode 1
and is no lorger needed in mode 2 may be either discarded (r = 0) or reassigned
to the spares pool and used in the event of a subsequent failure (r = 1). To
emphar;ize the relative importance of the various parameters influencing the
system reliability, we limit consideration to the following cases:
K I (dormant units ar ,. as liKely to fail as active units) and K = . (dormant
units never fail); 6= 1 (coverage is independent of the number of failed spares
that have to be tested prior to recovery) and 6= 0 (recovery is possible only
if' no apa res have railed). The resulting expressions are tabulated In Table 1
as a function of P = e -At , the probability that a single unit survives until
tiro( t, and the coverage C. Several of these expressions are then tabulated in
T0.1;	 a,: a funcLiori of P for various val-es of C.
T14,: precelinr example considerec `.:.e effect of various per' `-
K I t,C) on the reliability of a single-stage system. We now consider a
-28-
00
RELLkBILIILE$
c^
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L i t	 3C) (2	 3C }	 :'	 (.	 i F +	 C 1	 C	 p-
1 
pJ MI - 3C) (2 - 3C) ^r 1	 _ p`	 ♦ !3 F3 -1 Fkl +	 (1	 F )^ ^ Y♦rCK = L ^ b
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2 2	 \ //	 12
(r = ^.	 L)
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)(((( (	 1	 P2/2 + 2/3 p3 _	 1	 py) + zC	 ^ 1 
_ p\4
J
l	 p 3C +	
^ - ^r 1 * ^C) p +	 C`	 P`
l\ TS 12
(r =	 L)
/`AC In p +	 C2 ln2 I^ p3
K —1 m	 [	 ^
(r = 0 , 1)
,7c-. 
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-29-
EThBIZ 2
NUMERICAL RELIABILITIYS
Ni - 3/ (;^ - 1, S = 2)
PARAMETERS
c = 1
..	 1
d = 1
c = 9
K = 1
a - 1
C 1
K - 1
b	 U
C = 1
K -
. u1 ^^ 1 L1'bl',y
UNIT
RELIABILITY R2 (t) R2 (t) TEAL TOTAL
p R_^) r= 0 r= 1 'r	 = 0 r	 i
0.2 .0579 •4096 .6144 .4675 •6723
0.4 .3174 .4752 .6048
O .6 .826 .2688 .3072 •9514 •9898
').8 .9421 .0544 .0576 •9965 •9997
0 . 9 .9914 .0083 .0085 •9997 •9999
0,2 .0509 .3205 .4647 •3714 .5156
o.4 .2828 .3719 .4632 .6547 .746o
o.6 .6219 .2103 •2373 •8322 .8592
0.8 .8908 .o426 .0449 •9334 •9357
0.9 .9622 .0065 .0066 .9687 .9688
0.2 .0502 .1843 .2765 .2345 .3267
U.4 .2=329 .2138 .2721 .4967 •5550
U.h .6307 .1210 .1383 .7517 •7b90
0.8 .9114 .0245 .0259 •9359 •9373
0.9 .9805 .0037 .0038 .9842 •9843
n.2
.1399 .4212 .D924 .5611 .81°'
0:4 .4817 •3755 •4887 .8572 •9704
0.t, .600r( .17Ub .1902 .9715 •99b9
0.8 .9695 .0287 .0304 .9982 .9999
0.) •9958 .0040 .0041 .9998 •9999
-30-
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multi-stage system but with some of these parameters restricted in or(ler to
	
4
keep the ai,nlysis reasonably tractable. In particular, we nssime that each of ;.
i
the n stages has the same failure rate A, that QXi = 2 , QX2 = 1, SX = 1, and
.1A -A - A X = A for all stages. As before, wu also assume that Y = A 2 = ,13 = G-
Under the conditions ,just specified, equation 8 becomes
n
IR
1 (t) = P2n i , 2C (1 - P I
with P = e -At the reliability of a single stage in the n-stage system. It
is also readily verified that equations 10, 11, and 8 become, respectively,
H X (*) = 21C (2C +a) (1 - e -' ) e -2
-2A7
't
S  (t, *) -- ao + a l e -.1* + a2 e -2a*
a t ►d
RX ' 2 (0, t - *) = P e+ X-r
wi':h
ao = r C P2 ( C,6	 P - 1 - 2(
a l = (1 + rC) (1 + 2C) P + C (r - ar - 1 - rC) P2
a2 = -C (1 + r -	 C) P
A- F„^•^,.,, t he rernmptPr r = 1 i P Pv— --a-Apri
	 were active in
mcxie 1 and are stilt functioning are to be used as spares in mode _ ai.d r = 0
-U-
otherwise. (It is assumed that either r = 1 for all stages, or r = 0 for
all. stages.) Thus, from equation 12,since all stages have identical paraueters,
t
R2 ( t ) = Td(t)	
o ^	
Sx (t, ' ) Hx k' ' ) Rx2 ( 01 ` "') d,
t	 x
= bnPk f( ao + ale 
	 + a2e -2X* )n - 1 (e 
-^' - e -2Ar) dr
with b = 2C (2C +b). Using the trinomial expansion
( ao + a 1 x + a 2 
x 2 ) n - 1 
= ( n -1 ) :	 aoi al ,J a2 	 x J + 21
1, j,k is j'. M.
i+j+k=n-1
and carryir3 out the integration, we obtain:
1- P j+ 2k+ 1	 j+ 2k +2
R2(t)=by	 n:
	
ao 	 -	 1-Pk:	 0	 1 ^ 	 2k+ 1	 ^+2k+2
i+j+ k=t:-1
When n	 2, for (xample, we find from the above that:
R(t) = R1(t) + R2 (t )
2
P^I r l+2C (1-P)]
+ C ( 2
//3
	
1(2
C +b) 
	+ 3C + d) - 2(C + 2d) P - 6(1 + 2C - d ) P 2
+2 (2 + 9C - 2d) P3 - ( 7C - d) P4, P2
with d = (1 + )C12 + 6/2) rC
-32-
19
rio
'Pi:is result is tabulated in Table 3 as a function of F2 , the probability
that a two-stage nonredundant system would have survived until time t., for
various values of the parameters C,i , and r.
TABLE 3
N1W,RICAL RELIABILITIES
"WO-STAGE CONFIG'.JRATION
Q2 = 1 1 Ql 2 p 
S	 1
Y'
s4
PARAICTERS
C = 1
b = 1
IRRFDUNDANT
SYSTEM RELIABILITY
J.L
0.4
o.6
0.8
0.9
Rl(t )
.1773
.4817
.7577
.9388
.9848
R2 (t)
r = 0
.4387
.3923
.2133
.0585
.ol49
R2(t)
r = 1
.5134
.4215
.2195
.0588
.0149
TOTAL
r = 0
.6160
.8740
.9701
.9973
.9997
TOTAL
r = 1
.6901
.9032
.9772
.9976
.9997
C - 0.9	 0.2 .1592 .3511
.404o .5103 .5632
A
	
_ 
1	 o.4 .4417 .3171 .3378 .7588 .7795
0.6 .7114 .1743 .1787 •8857 .8901
0.8 .9064 .0484 .0486 .9548 .9550
0.9 .9666 .0124 .oi24 .9790 .9790
C = 1	 0.2 .1773 •2925 .3360 .4698 .5133
0	 0.4 .4817 .2615 .2786 .7432
.7603
0.6 .7577 .1422 .1458 .8999 •9035
o.^ .9388 .0390 .0392 .9-T7p
man
0.9 .9848 .0099 -	 .0100 •9947
.9948
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ITo illustrate the use )f the coverage model, consider a set of three
software test y, and two hardware detectors designed to dsteet faults in a
given category. Let the three software tests tah 3e detection probabilities
Pi , i = 1, 2, 3, and detection rates,
1	 OS T < pLi
li^*)
i 
= 1, 2, 3	 0	 Otherwise
Further, let test 1 i,e run every minor cycle (i.e. every T seconds), test
:? every other minor --yele, and test 3 every third minor cycle, and let them.
to scheduled as shown In Figure 3 . 	 Then, with reference to equation 15, we
have rnl : 1, n2 = 2, n3 = 3, nc = 1nm (1 0 2, 3) = 6.	 It is -onvenient to assume
Dia l: the time separation between the i th and 3th software tests exceeds the
duration of Loth	 ( i .e. that	 t i j 2: 	 ti + Ot J ) since this condition considerably
irrq,liIles r.he resulting expressions for gi '	 (1).
FIGURE 3
DIAGNOSTIC TEST SCI DULES
t32
	
L-1
^~ t1.2(	 t23
`^	 f M _1`L.t.21 ~tl3 ~t3rI t	 L^M
T	 2T	 3T	 4T	 5T	 6T t7T
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S
*eking this assumption, defining .rk
1	 f 6	 t i,j	 - Oti
1 - Pi	 (T	 ( t !.^	 ' O t i ) l2	 tij tip
dt,
P1.5
	
(7)	 _
1 - Pi + P i 	(•	 - (t i j + Oti ) )2	 t i J < r < t i j + &ti
2	 \	 Ot	 /i
1 P	 ti,+	 t i < 7
tine letting p i g' ( T ) be similiarly defined but with t ip replaced everywhere by tij + T,
we can carry out the integration in equation 15 obtaining:
91r	 ( T )	 = (2 + p 31 (T))(l + p 21 (r)) 0
< T<T
T < T
0
1	 p	 (7)(1 +	 p
3k 
(T) +
	 P32'	 (r)) 0< T< 2T
92,	 ( T ) 7T- 2T < T
0
and
p13	 (T)(p ^3	 (7) + p ^3'	 (7)
1
^ 031 < < 3T3 	 r	 (7J
^—	 l .^
^J
Now :appor,( th,• tvo hardware de r.ectors can both to modeled as impulse
Of'('wi r.h a dc'	 :elL.	 of t 4 seconds and ' }iF
t,	 sf:rorid	 delay. It then follows from eq,Aation 16, that:
g i ' ( T ) 0< 7 < t4
^. i 	(T)
-
i 	 =	 1, 2,	 3	 (1 - P4) gi'	 ( 7 ) tL < T < t5
(1 - rl
	 11 - r 5 i 	 bi'	 lt d -	 :.ii
()p poo.R PAGE I8R QUALrri
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3	 t44 0
3	 t5
8') ( r ) _ (1 - p4) 1 -^ P^	 g^' (q) dv b(r - t5)
=1
with i(t) the Dirac delta function.
Suppose further that the isolation procedure associated with each of these
•ts:c+,ors requires exactly r d seconds (i.e. hi (r) = b ( r - rd ), all i), that
amount of :irr>t need,!d to test a spare is r s seconds, and that to' ai recovr^,
	
is possible P' and only if the fault is both detected and isolated within:r r. 	 seconds
cf its occurrence (i.e. r i ( r , r ') = 1 - u ( r + r ' - rr) with u k'r ) a unit, step
:nct ion: u (*)	 0, r < 0; u ( r ) = 1, * > 0). Then, from equation 14, we hay.::
f	 m	 m
O ik	 I' i PI' pit	 ^^i (*)	 b (r, - krs - *d)11 - u (r + r ' - r : )] dr'd*
o	 0
- kr
	
TS rr - r d
	
s
= P. p i p,,k	 gj (r) dr
Fltt^ou,;r w, could cQuLinue with this example at the present le-:el of ger.^ralit;,,
+•<r:ults ai- uwre read'.ly interpretatle if we add some additional constlairts. In
,)ar' ictilhr,
P 1 	P	 P3 - Ply = P5 _ >3
1,1^1 -- L23 __ ' 31	 T/3
-lh i.
w0	 t4 = T/4
t^ = T/2_
Tr	 jT/;
Td	 'C/4
TS -- T/4
The above expression for Cik then heromes'
r	 T( - 3) P +
 —173 P2 4/ 9 113 + -1 P4/'
C12	
p ( 3 /l j - 67 p + 41 P2
 - 11 p3 + 1 P4
	
72	 72	 72	 72
C-,1	P/2 ^ 1 - ^ P + 2 P2 - 5/6 p3 * 1 p
C 22
	
P/? 3/4 - ,t P + p2
 - 1/3 P - 1/36 P4/
c j 	 P/6 t 2 - o--j - P + ? .. p2 - 11 ?3 * 1 P4/\	 b	 o	 ^
CP/5 i/ - 2% P + 19 p2 _	 P^ + 1 P4.32	 12	 12	 L'"	 1? )
C42	 1 1 - 11 yl
C^	 }' 1	 Yl \ 1 - 11 Y + 1/6 P`^1	 .2	 /	 7
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Numerical values of these coverage coefficients are tabulated in Table 4 as
a t'unction of the probability P that any one of the detectors would by itself
eventually detect the fault in the absence of any competition.
TABLE 4
COVERAGE COEFFICIENTS
P k Clk C2k C 3 C4k C 5 Ctot b = CIA-
1 .2500 .1250 .0833 .5417 0 1.0000
1 2 .2500 .1250 •0833 •5417 0 1.0000 1.0000
.99 1 .2495 .1242 .0831 .5408 60025 1.0000
-9-9 2 .2494 .1242 .0831 .5408 .00 5 1.0000 1. 0000
.9; 1 .211,01 .1210 .0819 .5364 .0133 1.0000
.95 r .24(" .1209 .0819 .5364 .0133 0.9997 0.999"'
.90 1 .2452 .1172 .C)806 .5288 .0279 •9997
.go 2 .2443 .1171 .0805 .5288 .0279 .9986 0.9989
1 .2415 .1106 .0779 .)067 .0597 .996L
8U 2 .2380 .1101 .0t76 .5067 .0597 .9921 0.9957
.0 1 .2327 .1013 .0727 .4350 .1224 .9641
.2193 •0974 .0705 .4350 .12.,)4 ,a44,- rr7oA
tc; 1 .208( .0917 .0647 .3267 .1584 .8502
!i. 2 .183;; .0823 .0590 .3267 .1584 .8102 •9530
1 .1040 .0670 .0458 .1817 .131' .5702
.1.171 .05!:.: .0361 . L817
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Several observations can be made concerning this particular example.
It will be noted, for example, that the hardware detector having Lrie T/4-second
detection delay is generally the most effec t ive devicm although Its ad vantage
decrease s with decreasing P. The relative effectiveness of the software diag-
nostic programs is highly correlated to the frequency with which these programs
are run and is comparatively independent of the order in which they are scheduled.
These conclusions, however, are strongly influenced by 1^he fact that the detection
and isolation procedures must be completed in a relatively short time in this
example for the recovery process to be successful.
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V. EXTENSION TO THREE: AND MJRE MDDE:
The CAFE II reliability model can readily be extended to include three
or more modes of operation although the complexity of the resulting analytical
expressions increases correspondingly. (The CARE II coverage model allows
coverage to be determined as a function of the mode of operation, so it already
is sufficient to model an arbitrary number of modes.) This increased complexity
is due in part to the fact that two or more mode changes are now possible and
ir, part to the increased number of ways in which this sequence of mode changes
can be instigated. (E.g. a spares depletion in stage i could cause a change
f'rorn iri(Ae 1 I .o mode 2 followed by a spares depletion in stage ,j causing a
fit-rrerw-rat.ion to mode 3 with both i = ,j and i ^ ,j as distinct possibilities.)
flit-,vertheless, '.he appropriate reliability exp ressions are straightforward
extensions of these described in Section II.
Consider first the case of three modes. In analogy with the category
two and category three failures defined earlier, let a category three failure
Le redefined as a failure that, by itself, prevents operation in mode 1 or
b,it t,ot in rnWe 3, and let a category four failure be one precluding all
ra'.: -.,, ( i .e., a ingle-point failure for the three-mode system). Then
.* r 1 * 1 tat: + 1i t,y cut • he three-mode configuration can ce written:
ii(t) 
_ (R,(t) + R2 (t) + R 3 (t),e -A4t	 (18)
wi • : H l (t) and R2(t) exactly as defined in Section II, R S (t) the probarilit:r
gar QI(! syst : err, survives until time t having degenerated to mode 3 some?.ime
r.rior to t, and e -A4t the probability that no categor; fuu& f 6.. ^aes, occurring
at a rx • a 4 failures per unit time, have taken place by time t.
U R j,-
'^UI QUA TGE^LS
4121
z
. _. 
t
lhMM -
"!1....
	
L . ,	 ti	 Alf ^'^!r . +	 ^i	 'f. 'rt-	 '^	 ;	 .'-ate ` ^a `_OIL_
Since expressi.,iis for R 1 (t) and R( t ) have blready been derived it
, emlhs only to cletermine R i (t ). To this enn .+e observe that there are sixJ
nnri,ielly exclusives categories of fault sequences that can result in a degen-
erai.ion to mode 3: (1) p Fault in stage x causes degeneration to mode 2
and n subsequent raulL in stage z causes degeneration tc mode 3, with x A Z.
(,'j) The previous fault sequence takes place but with x = z. (3) A category
two fault causeb iegenenotion to mode 2 and a subsequent failure in stage x
causes degeneration to mode 3. (4) A failure in stage x causes degeneration
to mode 2 and a category three failure causes degeneration to mode 3• (5)
A category two failure causes degeneration to mode 2 and a category three
failure causes degeneration to mode 3- (6) A category three failure forces
Oic	 to degenerate directly from mode 1 to mode 3. (It is implicitly
by this verbal description that the number of operational units re-
yt,Irc.-4J I'or ar,y stage In mode i is at least one greater than that required for
„lN ►'I,^.Ira, In mode .1 ['or 1 <,1. Thus, no single failure in any stage can by
i f .aell' cause degeneration from mode 1 to mode 3. The expressions to be derived,
however, will remain valid even if this assumption is violated provided the
,roper limitlrg conditions are observed.)
Let T31 ( t ) denote the probability that the ith event itemized in the previous
r— ra r,ranh e(,t ually takes place. Then:
6
R3 (t) _	 T31(t)	 (19)
i-1
In order to derive e xpressions for the T31 (t) terms, It is convenient to define
some additional terms analogous to those used in Section II. Specifically, let
bRIGINAD PAGE IS
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v ( r 1 , r 2 , t) =
s  Sx- iE	
- E Gxl (3, rl (X J1 	 µ) 1	 k 1 (1 - e - x
3 =0 k=0
Wx ('l,'2, t)	 IIxl ( '1 ) Hx2 (r1 , '2 - ' l)
and let.
s  Sx - j
x '1''2' t) F, rxl ''*1
J =0 k = 0
r7X	 x,,
	
,
j = 0 i
x e -iµx (r2	 ^ l) Rx3(1
-42
Ux (r l , r?,t ) _
rr1r1
L..I L..^ Hxl(rl) Gx2 (rl - J, r^ - 7 1 ) 	 ^1 - e -µx(*
` 	'1 j - 1 e - i µ x (r2 - rl)x
=0 1=U
X Rx3 (" I t - T2)
These expressions denote the probability (density) that stage x survives
in m(:)ae 1 and until time • l , in mode 2 until time r 2 and in mode 3 until
time t. They differ in that Ux(' l , 72 ) t ) represents the case in which the
first mode change is due to a depletion of spares in stage x itself,
Vx ( ' l ,'? , t ) the case in which x causes ttie second mode change, Wx(rl , 72) t )
the case in which it causes both changes, and S x ( *1 ,'2,
 t ) the case in which
neither of the changes is due to a spares deficiency in stage x. These
expressions are entirely analogous to those described in Section II. As there,
these expressions also assume that all spares not already known to be defective
are tested at ea,^h mode change. The terms Hx j (,'), Gx.,(i, +), Rx„ (i, t) etc. are
as defined in Set-tion II (the second subscript refers to the mode), and
Hxf (*) with Sx replaced by i. (When e = 2 here, the coverage terms
becorrw- C x ” and d x '', the double "primes" indicating that the mod e 2 to mode 3
t.ransiLional values of' these terms are to be used.) Again, as in Section II,
the "prime" on an integer indicates that this parameter is to be
incremented as appropriate if active units are reassigned to the spares pool.
(E.g. in the expression for Ux('1,
 * 2 , t) , i' = i if units are not reassigned
and i' = i + Qx2 - Q,x3 if they are. Simi l.arly, k' = k + Qxl - Qx2 in the
expression for Vx (* 1 , *2 , t) if the active units of stage x are reassigned at
the Lime + 1 , an(t k' = k otherwise.) The parameter r l
 is also as previously
defined and r2
 ir: the corresponding term when the transition is from mode 2
to mode 3: r2 = 0 if units are not reassigned; r_1= = Qx2 - Qx3 - 1 if they
are.
The probabilities T31 (t) can now be expressed in terms of these functions:
-43-
Tjl(t)
t 7 2
fo
-a,	 ,,•	 d.
Ux('1,'2	 t) V . (•1 , T2 ,	 t) 13	 z	 Sy('1''2,t ) e
	
2 1	 e	 3 2	 d	 l	 2
y40
x z	 x
t r,,f 1: WX
x
x
Sy('l, ' 2 ' t) a -x2*1 a 
-x`3'2 d '1 d'2
T 
33 
W = A 2 C2 1: f t 7"'S ('1 1 
T2 
1 
t) e -a 2 *1 ux (TI , 721 t ) e -43'2 d'1 d,2
X
	
,J	 o ,fix
t ,^
r, 1 (t) = A c, r
	
[j	 Sy('1,'20 t) Ux ( ' 1 , '2 , t ) e -12 '1 e - x`3'2 d'ld'2
3	 3 .5 L..^ ^ o y^x
X
(24)
t
,^o
A ^, C	 '2 n Sy (' 1 , '2 , t ) e -'k2'1. e -A2r2 d'1 dr2
^I,(^')	
J►
 2 3	 3 f	 y
t
T 	 C	
c n
	 S (' 1 ,'l ' t) e -A2 ^ 1 e -a3'1 d11
3 3
	 y	 y
I'he extension to four and more modes is straightforward but the resulting
expressions become correspondingly more complex. For four modes the reliability
ass l inc : the form
h(t) =(R 1 ( t ) ' R2( t ) + R 3 (t)/ a 
- ( X4 
+X5) t + R 4(t) e _A,5t	 (25)
en-i f r five modes
l e _(a 4 + X5 + 
A,6 ) t + R4(t) e 
-( f► 5 + 6) + R5(t) a -X6t
(26)
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etc. The terms R 1(t), R2(t), and R3 (t) are as previously defined. Tne
probability R 4 (t) Involves twenty-two terms similar to the T 31 (t) terms ,just
defined but with many of these terms triple integrals; R5 (t) requires seventy-
three Such terms many of which are quadruple integrals.
While the CARD; II program could in principle be extended to include more
than two modes, it is apparent from the preceding discussion that the time
required to calculate R(t) for any particular set of parameters is do ex-
ponentially increasing function of the number of modes allowed. If additional
restrictions were imposed on the model, however, the time needed to complete a
computation could rye brought, back to reasonable values. If, for example, it
could t:e establish A that failures of category two arid higher were sufficiently
unlikely to be ignored, the complexity of the computation could decrease dram-
atically. Only two of the six T31 (t) terms required in the evaluation of R3(t),
ror c:xample,would remain; R 4 (t) would involve only five triple integral= and
R, 
.0 	 fifteen quadruple integrals rather than the seventy-three previously men-
tioned. In addition, the number of terms would reduce still further (and the
resulting terms world to simpler) if the number of stages comprisin g the comp-
uter system were restricted. (In the above discussion it was assumed that the
number of stages was at least as great as the number of modes minus one (i.e.
three staves in a . -mode configuration, etc.) If only two stages were allowed,
for example, the n unber of terms needed to evaluate R 5 (t) would be reduced
further from fifteen to eight; and only one such term is required to model
a oinrlle-stage system.
L
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMEENDATIONS
The CARE II program as it currently exists is an extremely versatile
tool for modeling the reliability of a dual-mode computer system. The computer
can be segregated into as many as eight different stages each with its own
coverage parameters, active and dormant failure rates, and its own complement
of spares. A mode change can result upon the exhaustion of spares in any
stage or from the inability to operate in a dual mode even when adequate units
are available at each stage (category two failures).
i.c, 3ectioll V. the extension of this model to include systems
capable of operating in three or more modes is conceptually straightforward.
Unfortunately, the resulting computational time can become excessive unless
some restrictions are placed on the generality of the model. Several possi-
bilities were identified in this regard.
Two approaches suggest themselves for implementing this extended version
of CARE II (with or without these additional restrictions). The obvious approach
is to use the present CARE II to calculate R 1(t) and R2 (t) and augment it with..
new subroutines to determine R 3 (t), R4(t), etc. The major difficulty with this
approacr is the excessive time required to evaluate the resulting multiple integrals.
(In general, an 1Z-mode model involves (Z-1)-fold integrals.) An alternative
approach using Laplace transforms to eliminate the reed for any integration
appears promising. Further investigation is needed to determine ti-,	 with
which the consequent inverse transforms can be evaluated by computer and to
estimate the complexity of the resulting program as a function of the number
of modes in the reliability model.
In any event, the extended program would consist primarily of a subroutine
-46-
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for evaluating Ri (t) with i the maximum number of modes likely ever to be
required (e.g. i = 5)- The terms Ri-1(t), Ri-2( t ) could then be determined
by repeatedly using this same subroutine p ith appropriate substitutions.
That is, suppose a subroutine were written to calculate:
R3 (t) _	 r31(t)
i = 1
with the T3i (t) terms as defined in equation 24. Then:
R2(t) =(T31' ( t ) + T33' (t))e -X3t
where T ' (t) = T (t) with V T +	 - -3i	 3i	 z( 1' 2 , t ) replaced by Sy (+ l , + 2 , t ) d (*1
z
Similar substitutions would yield R 1(t) and the desired result would be obtaire:`.
after three (or,in general, i) successive iterations using this sane subroutine.
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APPENDIX
A PROOF OF KUATION 5
VTI.
'Pie recursion
m	 t
G(m + 1, t)
	 f!
	 E
1
* ru - 1	 -µr	 m - i -KQP (t -'r)
KQ^ G(i,+) (1 - e
_N 
)	 e	 Cb	 a	 d+ (c
follows directly from the definition of G(i,t). That is, exactly m + 1 spares are
used L)y time t if a failure occurred in the infinitesimal time interval (+,+ + d+)
(an event having probability K40 if), if exactly i spares had been used up to
that point `G (i, +)), if the first m - i spare. '.ested are defective (( 1 	 e n )	 -
but the (m - i + 1) st spare is operational. ( e -µ '), if recovery is possible under
these conditions (CA m - i ) and if the system survives for the remaining t - +
units of time without any additional failures
- KS,µ (t - +)(e ). Integrating the
resulting probability density over all +, 0< * < t, yields the conditional
probability that exactly m + 1 spares are used given that m - i + 1 spares
had to be tested during recovery from the las t_ failure in that interval. Since,
for any m > 0, 1 must be an integer in the range 0:5 15 m, since these ev^tnts
are :,:..-wally exclu:,ive for different integers i, and since at least one fa{lure
must rave occurred for any m >0, th(^ sum of these probabilities over all i,
0< i 5 r:, rust egiAa-!_ G( m + 1, t).
Now assume that. equation (5) is true for all G(i, t) with OS i <_ r¢. The:
substit^iting this expression for G(i, t) into equation (27) and rearranging
terms, we obtain:
`31 ( m + 1, t)
m
t
M+
J
1-v
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-µ+\	 --µ+ T e
-KO At
\ 1
-;-o-
T,	
11
	
KC(
M + m	 µt m 
e
-KQµt
m	
bm	 (1 -e
	
\	 m
	
M' 
m	
m+ 1 (1 - e-µt) m+ 
1 e-KQµt
(m ► l)b
Thus, since equation (5) is obviously true for i = 0, it is also true,
by recursion, for all integers i >0.
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